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Abstract 
 
Since it is impossible to predict and identify all the 
vulnerabilities of a network, and penetration into a system by 
malicious intruders cannot always be prevented, intrusion 
detection systems (IDSs) are essential entities for ensuring 
the security of a networked system.  To be effective in 
carrying out their functions, the IDSs need to be accurate, 
adaptive, and extensible. Given these stringent requirements 
and the high level of vulnerabilities of the current days’ 
networks, the design of an IDS has become a very 
challenging task. Although, an extensive research has been 
done on intrusion detection in a distributed environment, 
distributed IDSs suffer from a number of drawbacks e.g., 
high rates of false positives, low detection efficiency etc. In 
this paper, the design of a distributed IDS is proposed that 
consists of a group of autonomous and cooperating agents. 
In addition to its ability to detect attacks, the system is 
capable of identifying and isolating compromised nodes in 
the network thereby introducing fault-tolerance in its 
operations. The experiments conducted on the system have 
shown that it has high detection efficiency and low false 
positives compared to some of the currently existing systems. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There have been two different approaches for 
securing networks and host computers from malicious 
attackers: i) intrusion prevention mechanisms that 
include cryptographic techniques to safeguard sensitive 
information from unauthorized access, ii) intrusion 
detection mechanisms that recognize an ongoing attack 
on a system and respond appropriately to thwart such 
intrusive attempts. An intrusion detection system (IDS) 
is a security mechanism that can monitor and detect 
intrusions to the computer systems in real time. An 
IDS can be either host-based or network-based or a 
combination of both. The conventional approach to 
intrusion detection involving a central unit to monitor 
an entire system has several disadvantages [1]. To 
circumvent the demerits of a centralized IDS, the 
research in the field of intrusion detection over the last 
decade has been heading towards a distributed 
framework. In these systems, the local intrusion 
detection components look for local intrusions and 
pass the results of their analyses to the upper levels in 
the hierarchy. The components at the upper levels 
analyze the refined data from multiple lower level 
components and seek to establish a global view of the 
system state.  
In this paper, the scheme of a distributed IDS is 
presented. This is an extension of our earlier work 
presented in [2]. In the proposed IDS, the knowledge 
about attack scenarios is introduced into a large 
number of agents in the form of a Bayesian network so 
that each agent is required to monitor only a relatively 
few aspects of the local network. However, the agents 
share their beliefs, and through timely coordination of 
the agents, the system is able to detect complex 
distributed attacks. For distributed inference, the 
concept of multiply sectioned Bayesian networks 
(MSBN) [3] is used in domain knowledge 
representation. To reduce network congestion and 
message overhead, the agents are grouped into 
subdomains. The communications among the agents 
are mostly confined in the subdomains.  
The main contributions of the paper are as follows. 
It presents a scheme for intrusion detection that 
provides: (i) efficient detection of intrusive activities 
by local monitoring and sharing of individual belief 
estimates of the agents for a collaborative detection, 
(ii) fault-tolerance by prompt identification and 
isolation of compromised hosts in the network through 
a distributed trust framework, and (iii) better detection 
efficiency and reduced false positives while providing 
enhanced robustness and fault-tolerance compared with 
the existing intrusion detection schemes. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 
2 describes the architecture of the system, agents and 
their communication framework. Section 3 discusses 
Bayesian intrusion detection framework used in the 
proposed system. Section 4 presents a distributed trust 
framework that enhances the fault-tolerance of the 
security mechanism. Section 5 presents the 
experimental results. Section 6 concludes the paper 
while identifying some future scope of work. 
 
 
2. Architecture of the system and agents 
 
In this section, the architecture of the system and its 
constituent agents are described. The proposed system 
consists of a large number of agents that collect data, 
analyze, and make appropriate inference. The agents 
use an inference process that utilizes a Bayesian 
network of data.  
The agents are grouped into several subdomains. 
The agents in the same subdomain communicate 
actively and frequently. Communication between 
agents belonging to adjacent subdomains happens 
infrequently. The agents have knowledge about a 
Bayesian network model of the structures of well-
known attack types as well as normal usage pattern, 
which is constructed offline from data repositories 
containing system logs from ongoing attacks. The 
global Bayesian network is partitioned into multiple 
subnets based on the spatial locations of the agents.  
Bayesian network approach allows for combining 
anomaly detection and signature recognition. For this 
purpose, one Bayesian network is generated whose 
nodes classify known attack types and normal 
behavior. Using this network, the agents can detect 
normal behavior and known attacks. If the probabilities 
associated with none of the target nodes cross the 
threshold, the system detects an anomalous behavior. 
Every host in the system has one special agent, 
called the distributed trust manager (DTM). It uses the 
Byzantine Agreement Protocol among the peers and 
identifies any compromised host in the system. This 
distributed trust mechanism makes the proposed 
system robust and fault-tolerant. 
 
2.1. Agent architecture 
 
Figure 1 depicts the architecture of an agent. Each 
agent consists of six modules. The functionalities of 
each of these modules are briefly described below. 
 
 
Figure 1: Architecture of an agent in a node 
Perception module is responsible for collection of 
audit or network data of the subdomain to which the 
agent belongs. Deliberation module is responsible for 
analyzing the data collected by the perception module.  
It enables an agent to reason and extrapolate by relying 
on built-in knowledge and allows the agent to update 
its belief in the subnet it is monitoring. Communication 
module allows an agent to communicate its belief, 
decisions, and knowledge to its peer agents in the same 
subdomain, and possibly, to other subdomains also. 
Action module takes appropriate actions when an 
intrusion is detected.  When an agent recognizes that a 
monitored host has exceeded the threshold of one 
known attack, it triggers an alert and communicates it 
to the system administrator. The agents can also trigger 
an alert indicating an anomalous situation, when the 
activated target node does not belong to those 
representing normal behavior or any of the known 
attack types. The system administrator can either 
confirm the attack (or take necessary steps to handle 
it), or reject the alert if it is found to be a false alarm.  
Knowledgebase update module updates the attack 
signature database if the system administrator confirms 
an anomaly alert. The Bayesian network is modified to 
accommodate this new attack in the knowledge base. 
Supervisory module is the central module that 
coordinates the tasks and interactions among the other 
modules. 
 
2.2. Communication system of agents 
 
As shown in Figure 2, three types of agents are 
deployed in the proposed system. The system 
monitoring agents collect, transform, and distribute 
intrusion specific data when requested and evoke 
information collection procedures. The intrusion 
monitoring agents subscribe to beliefs published by the 
system monitoring agents and other intrusion 
monitoring agents. Each intrusion monitoring agent 
has the knowledge of a local Bayesian network of 
attacks. These agents update their knowledge on 
receipt of information from other agents. For each 
registered agent, a registry is maintained for the 
variables it monitors. The agents use the registry to 
find the names and locations of agents, which may 
have data that they are interested in. The messages are 
in XML format and may be of different types e.g. : (i) 
registration of agents with registry agents, (ii) request 
to registry agents for locations of other agents, (iii) 
search of agent queries, iv) belief subscription requests, 
v) belief updates. 
Figure 3 shows two different types of 
communication among the agents. Various 
mechanisms exist for these communications [4]. In the 
proposed mechanism, the shared memory architecture 
is used for agent communication since it allows large 
volume of data to be shared among agents. For 
efficient communication among agents over the 
 
 
network, an agent management system (AMS) is used. 
The capabilities provided by the java agent 
development environment (JADE) [4] framework has 
been utilized to build an AMS. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Major components of the system 
 
 
Figure 3: Agent communication architecture 
 
For security, public key infrastructure (PKI) is used 
to provide two-way authentication of the agents and 
the messages. The messages are encrypted using 
symmetric key cryptography. 
 
3. Bayesian Intrusion Detection 
 
This section describes how the concepts of 
Bayesian networks and MSBNs are applied in the 
proposed IDS. As mentioned in Section 3, the 
knowledgebase of the attacks are distributed in the 
agents in the form of a Bayesian network. A Bayesian 
network is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) in which 
the nodes represent the variables, and each directed 
edges represents a dependency between the 
corresponding variables. The effect of the parents of a 
node on a node is represented by conditional 
probabilities of that variable given values of its parent 
nodes in the form of a conditional probability table 
(CPT). There are several reasons for using Bayesian 
network in the proposed system. First, a Bayesian 
network can handle incomplete information, which is 
suitable for the agents that have limited local view of 
the network and may receive only partial information 
about a possible attack. Secondly, a Bayesian network 
can represent causal relationships among variables, 
which can help an intrusion detection model to 
combine a priori knowledge and observed data to take 
a decision. Finally, a Bayesian network allows 
updating of the beliefs and thus can be used to 
recognize novel attack signatures. In the proposed 
system, a Bayesian network is first constructed from a 
database of known attacks, which is then partitioned 
into several subtrees following the principle of MSBNs 
[3], and distributed among the agents. This process is 
explained in the following subsection. 
 
3.1. Inference with MSBNs 
 
An MSBN consists of a set of interrelated Bayesian 
subnets each of which encodes an agent’s knowledge 
of a subdomain. In such a framework, probabilistic 
inference can be performed in a distributed fashion. 
Multiagent inferences in MSBNs are usually done 
using message passing in junction trees (JTs) [3]. The 
linked junction forest (LJF) method compiles each 
subnet of a multiply connected network into a JT by 
clustering the triangulated moral graph of the 
underlying undirected graph. The algorithm performs 
message propagation over the JT.  Message passing 
among agents in two adjacent subnets is performed 
through a linkage tree. Though belief update in a 
Bayesian network is NP-hard [5], it can still be used 
for intrusion detection since the subnets are usually 
small. 
 
 
Figure 4: DAGs of three subnets of an MSBN and 
JTs constructed from the subnet 
Figure 4 shows an MSBN with three subnets G0, G1, 
G2.  Each of these subnets contains a group of agents. 
The LJF method has compiled each subnet into a JT 
(called a local JT), and has converted each d-sepset 
into a JT (called a linkage tree). Figure 4 also depicts 
three local JTs and two linkage trees of the monitoring 
system. Each oval in a JT or a linkage tree represents a 
subset of variables and is called a cluster. For instance, 
{o, i, j} is a cluster in a JT in the subnet G2 and {i, j} is 
a cluster in the linkage tree between subnets G2 and G0. 
Local inference is performed by message passing in the 
 
 
local JT. Message passing between a pair of adjacent 
subdomains is performed using the linkage tree.  
Once a multiagent MSBN is constructed, agents 
perform probabilistic inference by computing the query 
P(x|e), where x is any variable within a subdomain and 
e is the observations made by all the agents in the 
system. The system-wide communication among the 
agents (about e) is vital for sharing of information 
among agents. However, since the agents are 
autonomous, the system-wide message passing is 
infrequent. Most of the time, the agents in subnet Gi 
computes the query P(x|ei , ei′), where ei is the local 
observations made by the agents in  Gi, and ei′ is the 
observations made by the agents of other subdomains 
as recorded in Gi till the last communication. This 
computation is called local inference. Since LJF has 
least overhead of inter-agent communication [6], in the 
proposed system it has been used to minimize network 
traffic due to inter subdomain message passing. 
 
4. Fault-Tolerance and Trust Mechanism 
 
In this section, a novel approach for introducing 
fault-tolerance in the proposed system is described. A 
distributed trust management scheme is developed 
among the agents in the system and a robust algorithm 
based on Byzantine Agreement Protocol (BAP) [7] is 
invoked among the peer agents. This enables a reliable 
and fast detection of any compromised agents in the 
system. If any agent is detected to be compromised, it 
is immediately isolated from the system. Use of BAP 
to identify compromised nodes makes the proposed 
IDS framework reliable, secure and fault-tolerant. 
 
4.1. Distributed trust management 
  
The agents are always vulnerable to attacks by 
intruders. If an intruder can compromise a host, the 
agents in the host will attempt to influence the JT and 
which will adversely affect the overall inference 
machinery of the IDS.  For early detection of 
compromised hosts in the proposed system, an efficient 
trust management scheme based on BAP is developed 
among the hosts. 
 
4.2. The Byzantine agreement protocol 
 
Lamport et al. described the Byzantine Generals 
Problem in [7]. The problem is as follows: Imagine 
that several divisions of a Byzantine army are camped 
outside an enemy city, each division commanded by its 
own general. The generals can communicate with each 
other only by messengers. After observing the enemy, 
they must arrive at a common plan of action. However, 
some of the generals may be traitors, and try to prevent 
the loyal generals from reaching an agreement. The 
generals must have an algorithm to guarantee that all 
loyal generals decide upon the same plan of action. 
The loyal generals will all do what the algorithm asks 
them to do; however, the traitors may do anything they 
wish.  
The BAP is essentially an algorithm designed to 
achieve consensus among a set of processes in a 
distributed system. These processes can arrive at a 
consensus if they all agree on some allowed values 
called the outcome (if they could agree on any value 
the solution would be trivial: always agree on ‘0’). 
Thus arriving at a consensus involves two actions: first 
specify a value, and the read the outcome of execution 
of the processes involved. The consensus algorithm 
terminates when all non-faulty processes come to know 
the outcome.  If we consider the generals in BAP as the 
hosts in a distributed system, and the consensus as the 
requirement of agreement among the hosts as which 
hosts are safe (i.e. not compromised), then the problem 
of identifying compromised host(s) in a distributed can 
be described more formally as follows. Consider a 
distributed system consisting of a large number of 
hosts, with each host having a group of agent. The 
agents cooperate to detect malicious intrusive attempts 
or actual intrusions into the system. Each host has a 
special agent - distributed trust manager (DTM), 
which continuously sends messages to its peers. The 
messages sent by the DTM are of two types:  (i) 
Message A1:  the host is safe with a value ‘0’, (ii) 
Message A2: the host is compromised with a value, ‘1’.  
Lamport et al. proposed a signed message algorithm 
(SMA) for solution of the Byzantine Generals Problem 
which requires O(n2) messages for n hosts. It works 
effectively if there are at most n - 2 traitors (i.e. 
compromised hosts). However for SMA to work 
correctly, some conditions need to be satisfied: (i) each 
message is delivered correctly, (ii) the receiver of a 
message knows its sender, (iii) the absence of a 
message in the buffer of a host can be detected, (iv) the 
signature of a safe (i.e. not compromised) host cannot 
be forged, and (v) any host can verify the authenticity 
of its general’s signature. 
With cryptographic mechanisms in place, the 
proposed system guarantees that all the above 
conditions are satisfied and hence SMA will work 
well.  
In the SMA, one of the hosts acts as the leader and 
sends an order to the other hosts. Whenever a host 
receives a message, it takes the order and puts it in its 
list of the orders received. Then the receiver signs the 
message with its own signature and forwards it to all 
the hosts whose signature is not on the order. If a host 
receives a message with an order that is already in his 
 
 
list, it ignores the message. When no more messages 
are left to be received, all the hosts choose an order 
from the list of orders they have received using this 
method. If only one order has been received, that order 
is chosen.  Because any order that reaches a safe host 
will be forwarded to all other hosts who have not seen 
the order, all the safe hosts will have the same set of 
orders to choose from, and thus choose the same order 
to obey. 
 
4.3. Distributed trust manager  
 
DTM forms and maintains trust domains. A trust 
domain is a set of hosts that share a charter and a 
security policy and behave consistently in accordance 
with that policy. The hosts in a trust domain ensure 
that no compromised host can join the trust domain. To 
understand the functions of DTM, we assume that at 
the beginning of a trust domain formation, all the hosts 
are safe. Any compromised host in the trust domain is 
identified by running n instances (n is the number of 
hosts in the trust domain) of SMA in parallel, assuming 
that the majority of the hosts in the trust domain are 
not compromised. If the leader of the SMA is not 
compromised, then after running the algorithm in 
parallel, all the hosts that are not compromised will 
know that the leader is not compromised. However, if 
the leader happens to be compromised, then one of the 
following possible cases may happen: (i) The leader 
sends ‘0’ to all the safe hosts. In this case, all the safe 
hosts will assume the leader host to be compromised or 
dead. (ii) The leader sends ‘1’ to only some of the safe 
hosts. In this case, those safe hosts that have received 
‘1’ from the leader are able to detect that there is a 
compromised host in the system. These hosts, then, 
send messages to other hosts informing about the 
suspected compromised host. On further investigation 
based on additional message communication, the actual 
status (compromised or otherwise) of the suspected 
node would be understood. (iii) The leader sends ‘1’ to 
all safe hosts. The safe hosts can now realize that the 
message is wrong, and the leader itself is compromised 
if it contradicts the majority. If the message does not 
contradict the majority, it is not possible to conclude 
about the status of the leader unless it sends a different 
message to at least one compromised host, which in 
turn forwards the message to a safe host. In the latter 
case, the leader host is compromised and is isolated. 
(iv) The leader sends two (or more) different messages 
to some of the safe hosts. The all the safe hosts 
together find contradictory instructions, and understand 
that the leader is compromised. In this way, DTM can 
detect compromised nodes in the system in all possible 
cases. 
 
5. Experiments and Results 
 
A proof-of-concept prototype for the proposed IDS 
has been built using Java and the JADE [4] 
environment. JADE is a middleware for enabling faster 
development of multi-agent distributed applications 
based on the peer-to-peer communication architecture.  
In the prototype IDS, each agent is endowed with 
three behavioral capabilities: filtering, interaction, and 
deliberation. The filtering behavior of an agent enables 
it to filter security events from the observations it 
makes. The interaction behavior manages the 
interaction of the agent with its peers and defines the 
way the messages are received and enqueued. The 
deliberation behavior allows an agent to represent its 
beliefs, goals, intentions, and knowledge in a semantic 
format. When an agent receives a detection goal, it 
updates a set of event classes to filter. When an event 
occurs, it is filtered by the filtering module and sent to 
the deliberation module. The deliberation module 
updates the agent’s beliefs, and checks whether the 
belief matches with an attack signature. If it matches, a 
detection goal is reached and a list of intentions is sent 
to the interaction module for execution. 
Experiments have been conducted to test the 
performance of the proposed IDS. The KDD Cup 1999 
intrusion detection contest data [8] has been used in the 
experiments. The original data contains 744 MB of 
information with 4.94 million records. The dataset has 
41 attributes for each connection record plus one 
connection record specifying one of 24 different types 
of attacks or normal condition. Thus, effectively each 
record is given a class label that specifies the category 
of attack to which the record belongs. All the attacks 
are grouped into 4 major categories: (i) denial of 
service (DoS), (ii) remote to local (R2L), (iii) user to 
root (U2R), and (iv) probe.  
A dataset of 15000 records is constructed by 
randomly selecting records from the original database, 
such that the number of data instances selected from 
each class was proportional to their frequencies in the 
original database. An additional class called the normal 
class is also constructed. The attack knowledge base is 
distributed among the agents, and a Bayesian network 
power constructor (BNPC) [9] is used to generate a 
Bayesian network from these sampled records. This 
Bayesian network is sectioned into multiple subnets 
utilizing the rules for sound partitioning in MSBN [3].  
Finally, the LJF method is used for intrusion detection. 
The prototype is tested in a network of 50 
workstations. Each workstation has Pentium 4 
processor, 3GHz clock speed, 1 GB RAM, and Linux 
operating system. The interconnecting medium is 
Ethernet with 100 mbps capacity. Using the Ethereal 
 
 
network sniffer, memory, CPU cycle and bandwidth 
consumption due to the agents are evaluated. From 
Table 1, it is evident that the average memory and the 
CPU usage on a workstation due to the IDS are 
marginal and the overhead decreases with increase in 
number of users. The maximum CPU usage by the 
agents is found to be 8.76% with the average being 
5.34%. During the period when the agents were active, 
only 15% increase in number of packets is found in the 
network. The average bandwidth consumed by the 
agents never exceeded 5%. 
Table 1. Impact of the IDS on user applications  
No. of users 10 20 30 40 50 
Mem. reqd with IDS (K) 331 471 601 710 795 
Mem. reqd. without IDS (K) 324 453 572 669 740 
CPU usage with IDS (%) 53 67 80 86 92 
CPU usage without IDS (%) 48 63 75 82 87 
For testing the detection efficiency of the proposed 
IDS and its false positives rates, 37 different attacks 
are simulated in the network on different workstations. 
Some of attacks are chosen in such a way that they are 
not in the knowledge base of the agents. This is done to 
test the ability of the IDS prototype to detect novel 
attacks. The detection efficiency of the proposed IDS is 
also compared with the scheme proposed by Li et al in 
[10]. From Table 2, it is evident that except for the 
‘normal’ scenario, the detection rate of the proposed 
IDS is better than that of Li et al.’s scheme [10].  
Table 2. Operational performance of the IDS  
Activity 
 
Detection Rate 
(%) 
False Positive 
(%) 
Proposed IDS Li et al’s 
IDS 
Proposed IDS 
DoS 98.25 97.57 10.25 
R2L 7.31 0.37 12.43 
U2R 86.42 71.49 10.57 
Probe 94.28 90.49 11.87 
Normal 97.80 98.13 7.31 
The better performance of the proposed scheme is due to 
the robust knowledge base building and inference 
mechanism of the JADE framework. However, like most of 
the existing IDS schemes, the proposed scheme has a low 
detection rate for R2L attacks. Although, the detection rate 
for these attacks is much higher compared to Li et al.’s 
scheme, it is far from satisfactory. Since R2L attacks are 
essentially different from the other types of attacks, there is a 
need for a different approach for detection logic. The DTM 
scheme is mostly responsible for the higher detection rates in 
DoS and probe attacks. The false positive rates are also found 
to be fairly low for all categories of attacks. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has presented the framework of a 
distributed IDS that consists of a group of agents 
cooperating with each other to carry out the task of 
intrusion detection. Using distributed computation and 
message passing, the agents detect both signature-
based attacks and anomalous activities in real-time. 
Apart from its ability to make distributed inference, the 
proposed IDS can also identify compromised nodes in 
the system with the help of Byzantine Agreement 
Protocol. The experiments show that the performance 
of the IDS is better than some of the currently existing 
systems. Development of a new detection logic for 
R2L type of attacks constitutes a future plan of work. 
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